The Unwanted Humanity II:
Between Biopolitics and Cunning History
(An Essay on Reproduction, Functionality, and Autonomy)
Introduction:
The Paradox of the "Unwanted" Humanity
According to data from the Guttmacher Institute from 2012 and 2014, approximately 40% of pregnancies in the contemporary world occur without the woman’s prior intentional decision to become a mother (Guttmacher, 2014). In Latin America, that figure reaches as high as 56%, while the average in Europe remains around 35% (Singh et al., 2012). And while the modern world formally recognizes female subjectivity, one must ask: if these are the numbers today, what can be said about the history of humanity over the past ten thousand years? About times when war, conquest, slavery, marriages of convenience, and strict patriarchal systems were part of everyday life?
Reliable data on reproductive intentionality in a historical perspective is virtually nonexistent—historical sources are fragmentary, and empirical research remains focused on the modern period. Nevertheless, if we define reproductive autonomy as a situation in which both parents consciously desired a child at the moment of conception, it is reasonable to assume that the vast majority of human lives—perhaps even 80 to 90%—came into existence without mutual intent (Milić, 2025). The reason for this lies not only in social or economic coercion, but more fundamentally in the absence of women’s sexual autonomy, which, for the most part of history, did not exist at all.
On the other hand, there is a striking asymmetry between the macro and micro perspectives of the same phenomenon. From the standpoint of societal needs and historical reproduction, one could argue that "unwanted" humanity—that which arose without the intentional decision of one or both parental parties—was relatively limited in scope. Societies have consistently sought to increase population numbers: for labor needs, military forces in wartime, conquests and colonization of new territories, inheritance, and so forth.
Thus, although from the standpoint of individual decision—especially from that of women—a significant portion of humanity was conceived throughout history without conscious consent or intentional desire, human population was for millennia sustained primarily through the inertia of systemic needs. In other words, humanity has, for most of its history, been "produced" in a manner akin to the breeding of domestic animals: reproduction was not an expression of personal will, but a means of securing resources—armies, labor forces, heirs, political power, and cultural continuity. Sexuality, in this context, was regulated, controlled, coerced, and institutionalized. Individual desire, even if it existed, remained without real social or legal validity. The reproductive decision was not a subjective matter, but a systemic function.
Starting from this anthropological paradox—the paradox of reproductive intentionality—this essay traces the dialectical process of its transformation. The key questions it raises are: In what ways has the tension between systemic necessity and individual will shaped the historical development of humanity? How is this relationship changing in the contemporary world—and what kind of future does it imply? Finally, what does autonomous will truly mean when it concerns the very foundation of human biological existence—reproduction?
Part I:
Implications of the Paradox of Reproductive Intentionality
The anthropological paradox described above is clear: historically, from the standpoint of the system, reproduction was in the vast majority of cases useful, desirable, and manageable; from the perspective of the individual—particularly women—it was often unwanted, painful, and imposed. The fact that humanity has survived despite being unwanted by its immediate, individual "producers" (i.e., parents) implies several key points:
1) The Domination of Biopolitics over the Individual: If we assume that the overwhelming majority of people throughout history (90%) were born without the explicit desire of their parents, and that this same mass of people came into being almost exclusively in function of broader or narrower social needs, then the system’s domination over the individual—and over her most fundamental biological right, reproduction—can be expressed with the same proportion: 90%. This domination, then, was systemic and nearly total.
2) The Individual as the Property of the System: If most people were born without conscious parental intent, then human life did not emerge as the result of individual desire but as a consequence of systemic need—that is, of coercion and necessity. Accordingly, the body and life of the individual were treated as the property of the system (the state, slave owners, clan, religion), and this instrumentalization was mirrored in the attitudes of parents themselves—who often perceived their offspring as a resource, not as subjects.
3) The Human Body as Raw Material: Across historical epochs, the human being was not born as a subject but as a raw collective resource. Like domesticated animals, humans were primarily regarded as corporeal energy ready for consumption—in labor and production, in war, in ritual, and in ideology. The body existed only as physical mass—flesh for use—made available to systems in much the same way that the bodies of domesticated animals are available to humans today for consumption.
4) Humanity as a Consequence of Violence and Coercion: Sexual relations have traditionally been organized by the right of the stronger and by the principle of force: physical, economic, and ideological. Authorities, institutions, and norms (arranged marriages, the right of the first night, the exchange of women) shaped reproduction as an act of social power. In this light, humanity is not the result of desire and decision—but the product of a millennia-long history of coercion and violence.
Contrary to conventional political, economic, or ethnological interpretations of history, this analysis centers on the fundamental biological function of life—reproduction—as the central axis of human historical development. Such an approach opens a new dimension for understanding the historical domination over human beings and their bodies. While class struggle (Engels, 1884), control of the means of production (Marx, 1867), or even the institutional matrices of patriarchy (de Beauvoir, 1949) have remained central to most analytical paradigms, the very process of generating life has often remained invisible as a locus of historical control and alienation. Anthropologists such as Maurice Godelier have emphasized that reproduction is not merely a biological act but "the organizational center of the entire social order" (Godelier, 1986). In this context, the question of intentionality in reproduction becomes essential—not only for understanding the past but also as a precise measure of both individual and collective autonomy in the present and future.
Part II:
The Convergence of Reproductive Intentionality as an Index of Autonomy
The paradox of reproductive intentionality reflects a long-standing historical tension between individual non-intentionality and systemic intentionality with regard to human reproduction. Since replication—or reproduction—is a fundamental characteristic of life itself, control over the act of reproduction represents one of the deepest expressions of autonomy for any living being, particularly for the human as a self-aware subject.
The distance between the two "horns" of this paradox—between individual non-intentionality and collective functional necessity—can serve as an exact indicator of the degree of social and subjective autonomy. The greater this gap (i.e., the more people are born without explicit individual intent and solely due to systemic needs), the lower the level of real autonomy and freedom. Conversely, the smaller the gap, the greater the convergence between subjective will and collective functionality, and therefore the higher the level of effective autonomy—not merely as a legal category but as actual power over one’s own life.
In this sense, one may even formulate the following ontological criterion:
The degree of human freedom in any given epoch is proportional to the degree of alignment between individual reproductive intentionality and systemic functional need for reproduction. The greater this alignment, the more real and tangible freedom becomes; the greater the disparity, the more illusory and formal that freedom proves to be.
The proposed criterion—the criterion of reproductive convergence—possesses three important epistemological properties: it is historically dynamic (allowing changes to be tracked across epochs), normatively neutral (containing no value judgment), and empirically verifiable (it can be quantified using demographic, medical, and sociological data). It will be employed throughout the remainder of this text as a universal measure of human autonomy.
Part III:
The Contemporary World – The Convergence of Opposing Poles of the Paradox
The contemporary world may represent the first historical epoch in which a potential reversal emerges in the pattern of the paradox of reproductive intentionality. However, this reversal is not the result of ideological victory, normative progress, or a rise in collective awareness, but rather the consequence of technological, demographic, and economic pressures on the system itself.
The widespread availability of contraception, expanded access to education, declining mortality rates, digital communication, and the growing economic independence of women—alongside unprecedented technological growth—are reshaping the very functional logic of reproduction. The system no longer assumes a blind, automatic need for exponential population growth. In some cases—particularly in highly developed societies—the system even favors lower birth rates, in order to maintain economic standards, social stability, and ecological sustainability.
This shift, however, is not liberatory because it was desired, but because it has become functionally necessary. Freedom here does not emerge as the outcome of a collective moral decision but as a by-product of structural transformation. This mechanism can be described as the cunning functionality of freedom: it is knowledge and technology that first alter the real conditions of life, compelling the system to redefine productive and social relations—only afterward does space open for the recognition of individual rights and autonomy.
For example, slavery was not abolished due to humanistic motives or moral sentiments, but because of industrial rationality and the shift toward more efficient labor models. The prohibition of child labor did not occur when laws were first enacted but only once children became less productive than adults. In much the same way, women’s freedom to make decisions about their own reproduction did not arise from normative consensus, but from their economic independence, which rendered the system more functional, sustainable, and rational.
In other words, the two opposing poles of the paradox—individual intention and systemic necessity—are beginning to converge. This convergence does not imply the disappearance of antagonism but rather the alignment of interests, a harmonization between personal desires and systemic imperatives.
Part IV:
The Future of the Paradox and Its Transformation
Although the tension between systemic need and individual autonomy is gradually diminishing, the paradox of reproductive intentionality does not vanish—it transforms and mutates, assuming new, more sophisticated forms. The most significant change lies in the narrowing of the gap between systemic demand and individual will. This convergence does not mark the end of the paradox or the elimination of manipulation; rather, it signals a new phase in which the system becomes functionally more efficient precisely when it allows greater room for individual choice.
From this perspective, the basis for cautious optimism emerges: the paradox persists, but its form becomes less violent, more interactive, and more complex. Three key aspects shape this transformation:
1) Capitalism and Resource Management: Systemic pressure on reproduction now assumes new forms—from fiscal incentives for childbirth to cultural campaigns that glorify parenthood. Although the decision formally remains individual, it is substantively steered through economic stimuli and algorithmically targeted marketing.
2) Biotechnology and Selection: Technological advancement enables genetic engineering, artificial reproduction, and selection based on desirable traits. These decisions will appear as personal choices, but at a deeper level, they reflect systemic norms and demands regarding the “ideal” offspring.
3) The Ideology of Choice: An increase in available options does not necessarily lead to greater freedom; rather, it often transforms freedom into an obligation to choose, placing the subject under pressure to select among preconfigured alternatives. Nevertheless, even within these constrained configurations, there remain opportunities for micro-autonomy and functional maneuvering—not as a result of “authentic alternatives,” but as a by-product of the system’s complexity and porosity. In this sense, freedom is not found in an ideal exterior, but in the displacements and fissures of what already exists.
At this point, a theoretical dialogue opens with contemporary thinkers:
Pessimists—such as Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, and Yuval Harari—emphasize the dangers of total surveillance, biopolitical control, and algorithmic manipulation. Foucault analyzes the ways in which power operates through norms, discourses, and institutional structures (Foucault, 1976); Agamben warns of the normalization of the state of exception as a mode of governance (Agamben, 2005); while Harari problematizes the loss of free will through algorithmic anticipation (Harari, 2018).
Although these authors point to real threats, they often overlook the internal dialectical logic of the system—where the pursuit of control inevitably generates side effects: new technologies, new knowledge, resistance, and changes in ideology and practice. These unintended by-products frequently open up new domains of autonomy. One of the main critiques of this position (especially of Foucault’s) is the following: manipulation is a symptom of freedom, not its negation. Only those who can no longer command resort to manipulation. Where absolute power existed—slavery, feudal subordination, direct coercion—manipulation was unnecessary; the master simply issued orders. Paradoxically, then, manipulation is an indicator of expanding freedom, not its demise.
On the other hand, optimists—such as Axel Honneth, Hartmut Rosa, and Amartya Sen—emphasize the importance of recognition, resonance, and the empowerment of capabilities. Honneth views freedom as the product of social recognition (Honneth, 1996); Rosa locates it in the establishment of a “resonant” relationship with the world (Rosa, 2016); and Sen in the expansion of functional capabilities through education and technology (Sen, 1999). However, this (essentialist) perspective also has its limits: it assigns too much importance to conscious subjectivity and normative consensus, neglecting the fact that the space of freedom often expands despite the subject’s will—through processes the subject does not understand, does not want, or even perceives as harmful.
In conclusion, freedom does not appear in pure form—neither as a simple act of choice nor as recognition. It emerges as a by-product and epiphenomenon, as an unintended consequence of historical transformations that no one fully controls. This is the fundamental distinction that renders this position Hegelian: freedom is not planned—it is discovered, without foresight, without intention.
Part V:
Conclusion – A New Paradox and Meeting Hegel Halfway
Systemic freedom does not emerge because it has been envisioned, normatively established, or politically proclaimed, but because it becomes functionally necessary. In the Hegelian spirit, we may say: freedom has never been the conscious goal of history, but rather its functional by-product. In the grand scheme of events, freedom does not arise through the deliberate choices of individuals, but through systemic pressures, conflicts of necessity, and shifting conditions over which no single actor has control. Hegel, in The Phenomenology of Spirit (1977, Preface, pp. 18–19), observes that “individuals may be unaware of the goal being realized through them, yet their interests and desires serve as instruments in the unfolding of the world spirit.” This is Hegel’s well-known cunning of reason (List der Vernunft): history instrumentalizes particular motives in order to realize universal ends—most of all, freedom—despite the will of the actors involved.
In this sense, freedom can indeed be described as an epiphenomenon of functional systemic transformations. However, this does not mean it is irrelevant or illusory. On the contrary—it appears as the unintended outcome of internal tensions, and only subsequently can it be institutionalized and normatively recognized. It is precisely this dialectic—the transition from epiphenomenon to norm—that renders this position both philosophically coherent and empirically traceable.
This second, perhaps even deeper, contradiction lies at the heart of the Hegelian conclusion: systemic freedom is born of coercion. Paradoxically, what appears as constraint—technological, economic, or biopolitical pressure—is precisely what opens new spaces for autonomy. In this process, freedom often remains invisible: it is not articulated, often not even desired, yet it arises as the functional by-product of systemic adaptation. Resistance to necessity does not negate its operation; it merely shifts its boundaries—and it is precisely in these unplanned internal shifts of necessity that new space for freedom emerges.
This is why freedom is rarely won as an ideological goal, ideal, or normative project, and far more often emerges as an adaptation to reality under changed conditions. It arrives belatedly, without pomp or fanfare, and is seldom recognized or celebrated as emancipation. Most often, it manifests as “normalcy”—the moment when no one questions whether a woman may use contraception or whether a child must work in a mine. And yet, not long ago, such moments were the culmination of struggle.
The relationship between the general and the particular—between systemic intentionality and individual will—remains structurally contradictory but relatively stable. What changes are the functional modalities of that relationship. The gap between systemic needs and individual desires is gradually narrowing, most precisely observable in the decline of the index of unwantedness of the human population—one of the most subtle and empirically meaningful indicators of reproductive convergence, and by extension, of social autonomy.
With that in mind, let us return to the initial paradox: a humanity that for centuries multiplied against its own will—akin to domesticated animals—is now entering an epoch in which reproductive decisions are increasingly based on subjective desire. And not because the system has become more humane, but because it has proven to be more efficient, sustainable, and rational that way. The paradox of autonomy begins as systemic necessity and coercion, and ends as a new possibility for the subject. That paradox is the cunning of history: what begins as necessity and constraint, culminates in freedom.
Footnotes
1 Guttmacher Institute. Adding It Up: The Costs and Benefits of Investing in Sexual and Reproductive Health, 2014. According to UNFPA and WHO, approximately 44–50% of all pregnancies globally are unintended—that is, women did not plan to become pregnant at the time of conception.
2 In South American countries, nearly 90–95% of pregnancies among very young adolescent girls (ages 12–16) were the result of incestuous rape (Singh et al., 2012).
3 See also: “Reason is realized in history through the actions of individuals, but in such a way that it uses their passions, interests, and goals as instruments for the fulfillment of its own ends. (...) This may be called the cunning of reason—that it allows these passions to manifest and find satisfaction, while at the same time directing the course of events toward its own purpose.” (Philosophy of History, trans. Sibree, Dover, 2004, pp. 28–30).
4 In this sense, the key to the mystery of Hegel’s “cunning of reason” lies in the reinterpretation of normativity as functional structurality—what appears to be intentional is, in fact, the emergent logic of a system that overcomes its own internal tensions. Rather than viewing the “cunning of reason” as a teleological normativity, it is interpreted here as the emergent rationality of a system that does not know that it knows—that is, a dialectical functionality without a subject
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